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SCHIRO v. FARLEY
114 S. Ct. 783 (1994)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On the morning of 5 February 1981, the semiclad body of Laura
Luebbehusen was found in her home by her roommate, Darlene Hooper,
and Ms. Hooper's ex-husband. Ms. Luebbehusen had been severely beat-
en with an iron and a vodka bottle, raped and sexually assaulted (both
before and after her ultimate death), and eventually strangled to death.
The petitioner, Thomas Schiro, confessed to a half-way house counselor
that he had murdered Ms. Luebbehusen and that he did the act under the
influence of drugs and alcohol. At trial, the State produced evidence
showing that Schiro had forced Ms. Luebbehusen to consume drugs and
alcohol before killing her. The State also produced evidence showing that
Schiro, following the murder, attempted to destroy evidence linking him
to the crime.
Schiro was charged with three counts of murder. 1 Count I alleged
that Schiro "knowingly" killed Ms. Luebbehussen; Count II charged
Schiro with killing the victim while committing the crime of rape (felony
murder); and in Count III he was accused of killing Ms. Luebbehusen
while committing criminal deviate conduct. The State only sought the
death penalty on Counts II and III.
At trial, the petitioner conceded that he had killed Ms. Luebbehussen
but argued that he was not guilty by reason of insanity or, in the alterna-
tive, that he was guilty but mentally ill, an alternative verdict allowed in
Indiana.2 The jury returned a verdict of guilty on Count II, killing during
the course of a rape, but left the remaining verdict sheets blank. At the
penalty phase of the trial, the jury unanimously recommended that Schiro
be sentenced to life in prison.
3
The judge, with authority granted to him by Indiana law, rejected the
jury's recommendation and sentenced Schiro to death, but without mak-
ing findings required by state law. The State later petitioned the Indiana
Supreme Court to remand the case to the trial court in order for it to make
written findings of fact regarding aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. The trial court found on remand that the State had proven beyond
a reasonable doubt that "the defendant committed the murder by inten-
tionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit...
1 At the time of the crime, the State of Indiana defined murder as:
A person who:
I. knowingly or intentionally kills another human being;
2. kills another human being while committing or
attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, crimi-
nal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape or robbery;
commits murder, a felony.
Ind. Code §.35-42-1-1 (1978).
2 The jury was given the choice of ten possible verdicts: (1) Guilty
of Murder as charged in Count I; (2) Guilty of Murder/Rape as charged
in Count II; (3) Guilty of Murder/Deviate Conduct in Count 1ll; (4) Guilty
of Voluntary Manslaughter; (5) Guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter; (6)
Not Guilty; (7) Not responsible by reason of insanity; (8) Guilty of
Murder but mentally ill; (9) Guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter but men-
tally ill; (10) Guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter but mentally ill. Schiro
v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047, 1062 (Ind. 1983).
rape." Finding no mitigating factors, the judge sentenced Schiro to death.
After relief was denied on direct appeal,4 Schiro then sought habeas
corpus relief in state court but was denied.5 The petitioner then filed for
habeas corpus relief in the federal courts but was denied because Schiro
had not exhausted all of his state remedies.
Upon remand, the Indiana Supreme Court again affirmed the con-
viction and sentence for a third time, 6 rejecting Schiro's claim that the
jury's failure to convict on the first degree murder count amounted to an
acquittal of intentional murder, and that the Double Jeopardy Clause pro-
hibited the State from using the intentional murder aggravating circum-
stance for purposes of sentencing.7 Furthermore, the Indiana Supreme
Court stated that felony murder "is not an included offense of [murder]
and where the jury.. . finds the defendant guilty of one of the type of
murders and remains silent on the other, it does not operate as an acquit-
tal of the elements of the type of murder the jury chose not to consider."
8
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 9
The federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit denied the petitioner's subsequent writ of habeas cor-
pus. 10 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Indiana Supreme Court's rul-
ing stating that the intentional murder aggravating circumstance did not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Seventh Circuit also concluded
that collateral estoppel was not implicated because the petitioner did not
show that the jury's verdict had "actually and necessarily" determined the
issue that he wanted foreclosed. 11
In the instant petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, Schiro alleged (1)
that because of the jury's implied acquittal at the guilt phase on inten-
tional murder, the reliance by the judge on intentional murder as an
aggravating circumstance at the sentencing phase of the trial violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause; and (2) that because the jury had found in his
favor on intentionality of the offense at the guilt phase, the State should
be precluded from relitigating the issue under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
3 In Indiana, to impose a death sentence, a jury must find that the
state has proven: ". . . beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one (1) of
the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (b) exists; and (2) Any
mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating
circumstance or circumstances." Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (i) (1994).
Subsection (b) sets out the aggravating circumstance found in this case as:
"The defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim
while committing or attempting to commit ... rape." Ind. Code § 35-50-
2-9 (b) (1) (Supp. 1978).
4 Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047 (Ind. 1983), cert. denied, Schiro
v. Indiana, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
5 Schiro v. State, 479 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied, Schiro v.
Indiana, 475 U.S. 1036 (1986).
6 Schiro v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. 1989).
7 Id. at 1208.
81d.
9 Schiro v. Indiana, 493 U.S. 910 (1989).
10 Schiro v. Clark, 754 F. Supp. 646 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Schiro v.
Clark, 963 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1992).
11 Schiro v. Clark, 963 F.2d at 970.
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HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held that the trial court did not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by relying on intentional murder as
an aggravating circumstance. 12 The court reasoned that Indiana "simply
conducted a single sentencing hearing in a course of a single prosecu-
tion." 13 Thus, the State has the right to at least one fair opportunity to
fully prosecute an individual accused of a crime. In addition, the Court
ruled that the petitioner did not carry his burden of proof in making out
his prima facie claim for constitutional collateral estoppel. Despite the
jury's implied acquittal, reasoned the Court, it could have based its deci-
sion on a number of other factors and therefore Schiro had not shown that
the issue of intentionality had been previously decided in his favor.14
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Double Jeopardy Clause
The Court addressed the petitioner's Double Jeopardy claim by first
noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause is a bar against repeated attempts
to convict an individual of the same crime after a jury has determined the
individual innocent. Where no threat of multiple punishment or succes-
sive prosecutions exists, however, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not
offended. The Schiro court, however, implicitly acknowledged that leav-
ing the verdict sheet blank on Count I was an acquittal of that offense.
15
Because of the unique bifurcated nature of the capital trial, however, it is
possible to consider the same conduct both at the guilt phase and at the
penalty phase without implicating double jeopardy, if the prosecution
relies upon that conduct to prove something other than guilt. Thus, the
Double Jeopardy Clause's bar on successive prosecutions for the same
offense normally will not be violated in the context of a single capital
trial.
In contrast to Bullington v. Missouri,16 in the petitioner's case,
Indiana did not reprosecute the petitioner for intentional murder: "[t
simply conducted a single sentencing hearing in the course of a single
prosecution." 17 Justice O'Connor went on to note that the State has a
12 Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994).
131Id.
141Id.
15 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (holding that an
implied acquittal occurs when the jury is dismissed without returning any
verdict on a charge upon which it had full authority to return a verdict).
16 451 U.S. 430 (1981). Robert Bullington was convicted of capital
murder and the jury at the penalty phase sentenced him to a term of years.
The conviction was overturned and upon retrial the State again sought the
death penalty. The Supreme Court held that because Bullington had
received a prison sentence after a trial-type capital penalty proceeding,
Double Jeopardy barred an additional sentencing hearing. The prison
sentence in the early trial amounted to an acquittal for Double Jeopardy
purposes.
17 Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 790.
18 See discussion of collateral estoppel claim infra.
19 The Court relies upon cases involving (1) retrial after appeal
(Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919)), (2) receipt of higher sen-
tence on appeal (Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988)), and (3) the use
of prior convictions to enhance a sentence (Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554 (1967)). None of these cases speak to Schiro's assertion that the
penalty trial should be considered a successive prosecution.
20 The Court must first "examine the record of a prior proceeding
taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant
right to "one fair opportunity" to prosecute an individual, and that right
extends to presenting evidence at an ensuing sentencing proceeding.
After Schiro, attempts to put forth a Double Jeopardy claim within the
context of a single capital trial will most likely be unsuccessful, although
the opinion leaves open the possibility that the prosecutor could be pre-
cluded at the penalty phase from relitigating issues clearly lost at trial. 18
The majority's opinion, as it pertains to Double Jeopardy, is open to
criticism. The Court supports its position that the sentencing phase of a
capital trial is not a successive prosecution for Double Jeopardy purpos-
es with cases based on a defendant's right to appeal and not on any cases
pertaining to the single sentencing proceeding at issue in Schiro.19 The
only case cited by the Court that is properly analogous to Schiro's case
was Bullington, supra, and that case was decided in favor of the defen-
dant.
II. Collateral Estoppel Claim
The Court held that constitutional collateral estoppel did not pre-
clude Indiana from finding the existence of aggravating circumstances
that the petitioner had committed intentional murder. The Court began its
inquiry by outlining the necessary procedures required to invoke collat-
eral estoppel.20 A state is collaterally estopped from litigating an issue
"when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and
final judgment .... 21 That issue, however, must have been necessary to
the decision. In other words, for an issue to be precluded the jury's pre-
vious decision must have depended on that issue and that issue alone. The
defendant carries the burden of proving that the prosecution is foreclosed
from relitigating the issue.
22
After reviewing the relevant factors, the Court found that Schiro had
not carried his burden. 23 The Court, however, left open the possibility
that a defendant could establish that an issue determined at the guilt phase
in favor of the defendant precludes use of the issue at the penalty trial.
The Court ruled that Schiro failed to meet the issue preclusion require-
ments.
matter. The burden is on the defendant (Schiro) to demonstrate that the
issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the
first proceeding." Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 791.
2 1 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). The defendant inAshe had
been charged with participating in a robbery of a group of poker players.
While it was clear that a robbery had taken place, the main issue in Ashe's
trial was whether he could be placed at the scene of the crime. Ashe was
acquitted at his first trial on robbery of one of the victims. At a second
trial for robbery of another one of the victims, the witnesses felt they were
better able to identify Ashe and therefore he was convicted.
The Supreme Court reversed this conviction because it found from
the record that in order for the defendant to have been acquitted in the
first trial, the jury must have found that Ashe was not at the scene of the
crime. Hence the state was collaterally estopped from reprosecuting Ashe
because a fact necessary for a finding of guilt had previously been found
in defendant's favor.
22 See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
23 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, listed several factors
in making her determination. First, the petitioner failed in demonstrating
that he was not the intruder. Second, the jury could have grounded its ver-
dict on an issue other than Schiro's intent to kill. Third, the jury's instruc-
tion on the issue of intent to kill was found to be ambiguous. Schiro, 114
S. Ct. at 792.
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It is important to note that the jury in Schiro acquitted on intent to
kill at the guilt phase and then unanimously recommended life at the
penalty phase of the trial. The jury never found intent to kill. At the penal-
ty phase, the jury could have found intent to kill and still recommended
life due to the mitigating evidence presented at the penalty phase.
Unfortunately, that part of the record was not discussed by the majority
and furthermore, there is no indication that at the penalty phase any evi-
dence was presented on that issue. Although the issue of insanity was
argued by defense counsel in his plea for clemency, it is unclear from the
opinion whether any evidence as to Schiro's intent to kill was presented
at the penalty phase. It may have only been presented at the guilt phase,
when it was only relevant to the relationship of insanity and intent to kill.
The Court held that the jury could have "grounded its verdict on an issue
other than Schiro's intent to kill." 24 The Court stated that the jury could
have thought that they were only able to return one verdict: "[O]n this
record," noted Justice O'Connor, "it is impossible to tell which of these
statements the jury relied on." The Court mentioned that the judge gave
an instruction which did not differentiate for the jury between the two
types of murder (intentional murder and felony murder). This line of rea-
soning appears to be questionable. Justice O'Connor's argument implies
that the jury may have relied upon statements made by the attorney rather
than on the judge's jury instructions. The law, however, presumes that a
jury will rely solely upon the judge's jury instructions for the law upon
which to base its verdict.2 5 The Court's reasoning suggests that the jury
relied both on the attorney's statements as well as the judge's charge.
Overall, this decision does not have any direct application to
Virginia criminal law and procedure. This is true primarily because
Virginia's aggravating circumstances, unlike Indiana's, do not specifical-
ly duplicate elements of any of the sections of Indiana's capital murder
24 Id. at 791.
25 The only major exception to this presupposition is a very limited
one found in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (ruling that a
jury instruction to consider co-defendant's confession only against him at
jury trial is insufficient).
26 Indiana, unlike Virginia, includes intentionality of the killing
within its aggravating circumstances scheme. See note 2, supra.
27 An example of this point is a defendant charged with two counts
of capital murder, one being in commission of rape, and the other in the
commission of a robbery. If the jury acquits as to the rape count, and con-
victs as to the robbery count, the Commonwealth at the penalty phase is
precluded from any argument or use of the rape evidence.
statute. 26 Schiro suggests, however, that under collateral estoppel, in
those cases where it can be determined that factual issues have necessar-
ily been decided against the Commonwealth at the guilt phase, the
Commonwealth is precluded at the penalty trial from offering evidence
alluding to the matters that have been decided adversely to it.27
After Schiro, certain Double Jeopardy claims which have been pur-
sued in capital cases are proven invalid. In Virginia, the Commonwealth
is required to accept a defendant's plea of guilty at any point at which he
proffers it.28 For example, it has been argued that if a defendant pleads
guilty to first degree murder under Grady v. Corbin,29 the
Commonwealth would be barred from pursuing the capital murder
charge. This is the case, it was argued, because the offense involves con-
duct for which the defendant has been previously found guilty. Grady has
recently been overruled, but even if it had not been, Schiro makes clear
that in a capital case, the guilt phase and sentencing phase is a single pro-
ceeding for constitutional purposes. "The state is entitled to 'one fair
opportunity' to prosecute a defendant, and that opportunity extends not
only to prosecution at the guilt phase, but also to present evidence at an
ensuing sentencing proceeding." 30 Thus, the Court makes clear that there
are some legal issues which may be kept out at a penalty phase; howev-
er, any attempt to plead to a lesser included offense and claim double
jeopardy is now clearly futile.
A less significant but permissible alternative to this discredited
approach is to request a jury instruction that the jury is first to consider
the predicate offense. If they acquit for that offense, then they would not
go on to consider the offense of capital murder.
Summary and analysis by:
Ali Khan Wilson
28 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-283: "No person shall be convicted of
a felony unless by his confession of guilt in court, or by his plea, or by
the verdict of a jury, accepted and recorded by the court, or by judgment
of the court trying the case without a jury according to law."
29 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an
offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct
that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been pros-
ecuted), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
30 Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 792.
BURDEN v. ZANT
114 S. Ct. 654 (1994)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In March 1982, a Georgia jury convicted Jimmie Burden, Jr. of the
previously unsolved 1974 murders of a woman and her three children. A
complex series of events, including a possible conflict of interest by
defense counsel, led to Burden's conviction, and led also to his ineffec-
tive assistance claim at federal habeas.
The case began in 1981 when Burden was arrested on suspicion of
having burglarized his sister's house. The court appointed Kenneth
Kondritzer, a local public defender, to represent Burden. While awaiting
trial, Burden's nephew, Henry Lee Dixon, accused Burden of having par-
ticipated in the 1974 murders. After warrants were issued for Burden and
Dixon in connection with these murders, Kondritzer began representing
Dixon. Kondritzer represented Dixon in a hearing held in November
1981, where the court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to hold
Dixon for the crimes.
The state indicted Burden for the murders on December 7, 1981.
Kondritzer continued to act as his counsel until he left the office of the
public defender at the end of December 1981 and Kondritzer's partner,
Michael Moses, took over. At trial, the prosecutor's only substantive evi-
dence linking Burden to the murders was Dixon's testimony. Though the
record fails to unequivocally establish that Dixon testified under a grant
